Foreign Affairs: The New Spheres of Influence. Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers
By Graham Allison. March/April 2020
Програмна стаття видатного представника інтелектуальної частини американського Deep State. Автора "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?" (2017).
Cтаття під пейволлом, тому я скопіював контент для тих кому цікаво. Хто не читає англійською може перекласти Гуглом.
Фактично стаття пропонує американському істеблішменту домовитися з Китаєм та Росією про нові, більш відповідаючи сучасному стану речей в Світі, зони впливу.
Ось частина особливо важлива для нас
"Ukraine will have to get over the loss of Crimea as countries in Russia’s “near abroad” learn to be both more fearful of and more deferential to the Kremlin. "
"Україні доведеться пережити втрату Криму, оскільки країни у «близькому зарубіжжі» Росії навчилися бути більш боязливими та більш щанобливими перед Кремлем."
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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence
Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics. That acceptance will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it could also bring a wave of strategic creativity—an opportunity for nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual arsenal of U.S. national security.
The basic view of the United States’ role in the world held by most of today’s foreign-policy makers was imprinted in the quarter century that followed the U.S. victory in the Cold War. That world is now gone. The consequences are as profound as those that Americans confronted in the late 1940s. Accordingly, it is worth remembering how long it took individuals now revered as “wise men” to understand the world they faced. Nearly five years passed between Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” an early warning of Cold War competition, and the policy paper NSC-68, which finally laid out a comprehensive strategy. The confusion that reigns in the U.S. foreign policy community today should thus not be a cause for alarm. If it took the great strategists of the Cold War nearly five years to forge a basic approach, it would be beyond hubris to expect this generation to do better.
Програмна стаття видатного представника інтелектуальної частини американського Deep State. Автора "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?" (2017).
Cтаття під пейволлом, тому я скопіював контент для тих кому цікаво. Хто не читає англійською може перекласти Гуглом.
Фактично стаття пропонує американському істеблішменту домовитися з Китаєм та Росією про нові, більш відповідаючи сучасному стану речей в Світі, зони впливу.
Ось частина особливо важлива для нас
"Ukraine will have to get over the loss of Crimea as countries in Russia’s “near abroad” learn to be both more fearful of and more deferential to the Kremlin. "
"Україні доведеться пережити втрату Криму, оскільки країни у «близькому зарубіжжі» Росії навчилися бути більш боязливими та більш щанобливими перед Кремлем."
( Collapse )
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/new-spheres-influence
Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics. That acceptance will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it could also bring a wave of strategic creativity—an opportunity for nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual arsenal of U.S. national security.
The basic view of the United States’ role in the world held by most of today’s foreign-policy makers was imprinted in the quarter century that followed the U.S. victory in the Cold War. That world is now gone. The consequences are as profound as those that Americans confronted in the late 1940s. Accordingly, it is worth remembering how long it took individuals now revered as “wise men” to understand the world they faced. Nearly five years passed between Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” an early warning of Cold War competition, and the policy paper NSC-68, which finally laid out a comprehensive strategy. The confusion that reigns in the U.S. foreign policy community today should thus not be a cause for alarm. If it took the great strategists of the Cold War nearly five years to forge a basic approach, it would be beyond hubris to expect this generation to do better.
